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INTRODUCTION

T

he commercialization of outer space has been stunted by
inefficiencies in the international laws regulating its use.
International law classifies outer space as the common heritage
of mankind.1 Under this regime, (1) neither outer space nor any
celestial body is subject to national (and, under some interpreJ.D., The University of Chicago Law School; B.A., Albion College. I would
like to thank Professor Tom Ginsburg at The University of Chicago Law
School, Isaac Gruber at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, and the staff of the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law. All remaining errors are, of course,
my own.
1. E.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies art. 11, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363
U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter Moon Treaty] (entered into force July 11, 1984);
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art.
I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 207–08 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty] (“The exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the province of all mankind.”).

*
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tations, private) appropriation,2 and (2) any use of outer space
must be carried out for the benefit of all states “irrespective of
their degree of economic or scientific development.”3 The particular quantity and type of “benefits” which must be shared are
unclear. No state or private entity has been willing to bear the
enormous cost of commercialization in part because international law prohibits national and, potentially, private appropriation, and even if the laws are interpreted to allow private appropriation, they require private entities to share some unclear
quantity of returns (“benefits”) with every state on Earth. Indeed, the diversity of interpretation itself creates an uncertainty that is prohibitive of meaningful investment. The tragedy, of
course, is that we possess the technical capability to commercialize outer space.
While the precise profitability of the commercial use of outer
space is unknown, space-faring states possess the capacity to
develop commercial uses. They have abstained from doing so,
at least in part, because international law has not provided
them with the assurance that they will reap the full benefit of
their efforts.4 For example, some potential commercial uses of
outer space include mining, manufacturing, and energy generation. There is silicon on Mars and platinum on Near Earth Asteroids (“NEAs”) and the Moon.5 A rare isotope of Helium, Helium-3, exists in abundance on Mars and the Moon.6 This isotope can be used in proposed fusion reactors, which, using the
Helium-3 on the Moon alone, could power the Earth for 500

2. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
3. Id. art. I (emphasis added).
4. See David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the
Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 201, 208 (2008) (“No country is likely
to undertake the enormous risks, economic and otherwise, associated with
Mars colonization without the legal certainty that their rewards will not be
distributed to others.”).
5. Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L
L. 489, 490 (2006).
6. See Collins, supra note 4, at 203 (“It is already known that Mars possesses vast resources of frozen carbon dioxide from which the important fuels
of oxygen, deuterium and helium-3 can be derived.”); Zell, supra note 5, at
505 (“Helium-3 is a helium isotope that is rare on Earth but is believed to be
abundant on the Moon.”).
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years.7 Separately, technology is being developed to harness
solar energy from the Sun’s rays in outer space and then
transmit it to Earth.8 Outer space also presents the opportunity for zero gravity manufacturing, which would allow companies to manufacture “products in increased quantities and at
greater levels of quality, all at a lower price than could be
achieved on Earth.”9
Additionally, there are contingent benefits to the commercialization of outer space. Heart monitoring technologies were developed initially to monitor astronauts’ hearts during the Apollo missions, and the need for more powerful and efficient computer technologies initiated major developments at technology
companies like IBM.10 These “positive externalities” are contingent upon demand from programs like Apollo. While these uses
only scratch the surface of those proposed, they illustrate the
great potential that lies just out of reach, arguably obstructed
by the collective inaction problem created by our international
space laws.
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I will discuss
the anticommons problem: the development of space law, the
current law, and other regimes that employ the common heritage of mankind principle. Part II will survey and analyze nine
proposed property regimes for outer space that claim to resolve
7. See Yukihiro Tomita et al., Use of Polarized Helium-3 for the Energy
Production, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS PHYSICS RES. 421, 424 (1998)
(“The minable helium-3 on the lunar surface is estimated as about 106 tons,
which corresponds to the amount of the energy demand in all of the world at
the middle of the next century during 500 yr.”).
8. See generally George I. Seffers, Space-Based Solar Power Comes Closer
MAG.
(Dec.
2010),
to
Reality,
SIGNAL
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2461.
9. James J. Trimble, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect
on Commercial Space Activity, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 521, 524 (1983–1984). See
also Leslie I. Tennen, Outer Space: A Preserve for All Humankind, 2 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 145, 147 (1979–1980); Martin Menter, The Impact of Treaties on
Commercial Space Operations, 1 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 390
(1977–1978). See generally Manufacturing, SPACE ISLAND GROUP,
http://www.spaceislandgroup.com/manufacturing.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2013) (describing the benefits of producing products such as electronics and
pharmaceuticals in zero gravity).
10. See CHRIS KRAFT, FLIGHT: MY LIFE IN MISSION CONTROL 192–93, 353–54
(2001) (describing the domestic and international economic benefits of the
Apollo space program).
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this problem. Finally, Part III will propose a two-tier regime of
first possession property rights wherein entities could, first,
commercialize space, keep their returns, and be regulated to
protect against inefficiencies, and, second, upon the satisfaction
of certain requirements, obtain territorial sovereignty.
I. A TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
A. Economic Inefficiencies Arising from the Regulation of
Shared Resources
A tragedy of the commons occurs when a shared resource is
overexploited by the individuals who share it.11 This occurs because the cost of increasing individual activity is borne by the
group as a whole, but the benefit of increased activity inures to
the individual alone—so each individual will increase her activity knowing that she will only bear a fraction of the cost, resulting in overexploitation. The cost of each individual’s increased
exploitation is an “externality”: “a cost (or benefit) of any given
action that is not taken into consideration by the actor in determining the level of that activity that is optimal from the actor’s point of view.”12
The classic example of a tragedy of the commons is a plot of
land on which multiple farmers graze cattle. Each farmer will,
rationally, seek to maximize her gain. If one farmer chooses to
introduce one extra animal to the plot, the benefit inures to her
alone, but the cost in terms of space, waste, and consumption
are borne by all of the farmers equally. Introducing one extra
animal is an economically rational decision for the farmer to
make because the personal benefit will outweigh the cost, so
she will add the animal. Because each farmer seeks to maximize her own personal gain, each will make this individually rational economic decision and the plot will soon be overexploited.13 As Garrett Hardin put it, “[t]herein is the tragedy.”14
The opposite, however, is also true. If a shared resource is accessible to a group, but any benefit taken by an individual must
11. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI.
1243, 1243–48 (1968).
12. JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 364 (17th ed. 2006).
13. See Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244.
14. Id.
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be shared equally among the group, the resource will be underexploited. For example, suppose that the plot of land from the
previous example is owned by a group of individuals, and that
under the land is a well of oil. If the land is regulated such that
any oil taken must be shared equally among all owners, no individual is incentivized to drill—if an individual does, she alone
will bear the cost while the group will share equally in the benefit. In this hypothetical, the resource will be underexploited.
Michael Heller has termed this situation a “tragedy of the anticommons.”15
There are two exceptions, or solutions, to the anticommons
problem. First, if the benefit is large enough (such that it outweighs the cost by a large margin), an individual might rationally choose to drill, knowing that even her equal share will
outweigh the cost. However, resources of uncertain value are
particularly susceptible to anti-commons problem, like, for instance, the resources in outer space. The second solution is collective action. Each of the owners could work together, bearing
the cost equally. However, this solution gives rise to transaction costs (negotiation and decision-making, for example) and
these costs rise with the number of members in the group. The
transaction costs between, for example, all of the states on
Earth would be, well, astronomical.
This is the problem facing the international community today. Because each state has an equal right to the “benefits” derived from outer space, and because national sovereignty is
prohibited, no state has been willing to bear the enormous cost
of exploitation. This is made worse because the benefits of the
use of outer space will be difficult to quantify until commercialization begins.
B. A Brief History of Space Law
The impetus for the original space race was the international
rivalry of the Cold War,16 specifically the Soviet Union’s launch

15. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
16. See John Hickman & Everett Dolman, Resurrecting the Space Age: A
State-Centered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime, 21 COMP. STRATEGY
1, 2 (2002).
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of the Sputnik satellite in 1957.17 The Soviet Union’s ability to
operate in space was problematic for the United States because
if any one state obtained control of, or militarized, outer space
it would gain a tremendous competitive advantage in international politics.18 The United States and Soviet Union immediately began to negotiate the proper uses of outer space.19
Throughout late 1957 and early 1958, they exchanged “mutually unacceptable proposals” intended solely to “portray [each
state] as [a] peacemaker,” which resulted in no settlement.20
On March 15, 1958, the United States requested that the
U.N. General Assembly establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“ADCOPUOS”).21 ADCOPUOS
was formed in 1958 and became a permanent body of the U.N.
the next year.22 Today, the group is known as “COPUOS”.
COPUOS “is the primary international forum for the development of laws and principles governing outer space,”23 and is
“charged with investigating the legal and political problems
posed by the use of outer space and determining what role the
United Nations should play in solving those problems.”24 Ini17. Sputnik
and
the
Dawn
of
the
Space
Age,
NASA,
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik (last visited Dec. 24, 2012).
18. See Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 3.
19. See id. at 4–5.
20. Id. at 5. For example, one proposal, clearly intended to be unacceptable, came from the United States on January 12, 1958, which proposed that
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (“ICBMs”) be prohibited in space. Id. ICBMs are long-range missiles that necessarily pass through outer space en
route to their destination. Id. At this time, the United States had numerous
foreign bases from which they could strike deep into Soviet territory, while
the Soviets had none—ICBMs were one of the Soviets’ only equalizing forces.
Id. This type of ill-willed proposal was representative of the climate of these
negotiations.
21. See Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International
Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into
the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 321 (2011).
22. See Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII),
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348(XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958); International Co-operation
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1472(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959).
23. International Space Law, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/index.html (last visited Dec.
24, 2012).
24. Trimble, supra note 9, at 526.
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tially, COPUOS was a failure, having not even formally met
during its first two years of existence.25 Then, in 1961, President John F. Kennedy addressed the U.N. General Assembly,
proposing that the U.N. Charter, the governing document of
the United Nations, be extended beyond Earth to outer space.26
In response, COPUOS convened for the first time and agreed
on a proposal to extend the U.N. Charter to the entire universe.27 This resolution, Resolution 1721, was passed by the
UN General Assembly unanimously.28
To clarify, under Resolution 1721, “the UN claimed legal authority and collective ownership of every natural body, and any
artificial structure, found anywhere in the universe.”29 Ignoring, for the moment, the legal and rational absurdity of this
claim (which will be addressed in Part III), Resolution 1721
was the basic framework from which space law was born. From
1967 to 1979, COPUOS enacted five major treaties that form
our space law: (1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space
Treaty”) in 1967,30 (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space in 1968,31 (3) the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects in
1972,32 (4) the Convention on the Registration of Objects

25. See Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6.
26. Id.
27. See International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 1721]; Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6.
28. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6.
29. Id. at 18 n.25.
30. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1 (entered into force with respect to
the United States on Oct. 10, 1967).
31. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
7570 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 3, 1968).
32. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 (entered into force with respect to the
United States Oct. 9, 1973).
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Launched into Outer Space in 1975,33 and (5) the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Treaty)” in 1979.34
The two treaties governing property rights of celestial bodies
are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. These two
treaties establish outer space as res communis—in Latin, a
“thing” (res) “for everyone” (communis)—or, using the treaty
language, the “common heritage [or, ‘province’] of mankind.”35
The res communis approach prohibits national appropriation of
property in outer space. It was chosen by the United States and
Soviet Union to “ensur[e] that no state could achieve an unanticipated advantage in space—for if any one state could dominate space, the face of international politics might be changed
forever.”36 In sum, the common heritage of mankind principle
was created during the Cold War for geopolitical stability, if
not out of fear. Non-space-faring states also supported this concept because it allowed all states to collectively “own” outer
space regardless of their economic development or contribution.37
The Outer Space Treaty now has over 100 parties—some
have argued that it represents customary international law.38
The Outer Space Treaty is the seminal treaty on space law, and
the other four treaties, including the Moon Treaty, “are to a
great extent simply amplifications and clarifications of the
principles set forth in the Outer Space Treaty.”39 The Moon
33. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 (entered into force with respect to the United
States Sept. 15, 1976).
34. Moon Treaty, supra note 1. The United States is not a party.
35. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I (using “province of all mankind”); Moon Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 4, 11 (using both “province” and
“common heritage” of mankind).
36. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 3.
37. See id. at 7–8; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, pmbl. (“Believing that
the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of
all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development.”).
38. See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2d ed.
2010) (“The [Outer Space] Treaty’s basic principles . . . can now be regarded
as representing customary international law.”).
39. Trimble, supra note 9, at 528 (quoting C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20 (1982) for the proposition that the
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Treaty has only thirteen signatories and none of them are
space-faring, which means the Moon Treaty has little relevance
to the practical discourse on space law.40
C. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty was signed in 1967 and entered into
force with respect to the United States that same year.41 The
operative language comes from Article I and II of the treaty. In
its first sentence, Article I states: “[t]he exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”42 “The
word ‘use’ has been interpreted to mean ‘exploitation’ on a nonexclusive basis.”43 However, there has been some debate over
the effect of this clause. In 1967, when the U.S. Congress ratified the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations stated that “nothing in Article I, paragraph
1, diminishes or alters the right of the United States to determine how . . . it shares the benefits and use of its outer space
activities.”44 Indeed, some have asserted that “a state or private
entity would not be required to relinquish its . . . profits from
space ventures.”45 James Trimble writes:
[T]he benefits derived from space must be shared with all
humankind. Sharing expected benefits does not necessarily
mean sharing profits, but rather is intended more as a philosophical guideline. The manner in which a benefit will be
shared depends upon the nature of the benefit and the activity which generates the benefit.46

Outer Space Treaty is the “main base for the legal order of the space environment”).
40. See AUST, supra note 38, at 340–41. (“When [space] exploitation does
become feasible, one can expect the major space players to promote another
treaty better suited to the needs of the time.”).
41. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
42. Id. art. I.
43. Trimble, supra note 9, at 530.
44. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 74 (1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty Hearings].
45. Trimble, supra note 9, at 530.
46. Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This uncertainty over the type and quantity of benefits to be
shared is at the root of the anticommons problem. The same
author concludes, “[c]orporations may undertake space ventures with an expectation of retaining some of the profits to
reward their efforts, but a portion of the proceeds and benefits
must be made available to the world community.”47
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states, in its entirety:
“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”48 There
has been debate over whether this anti-appropriation language
applies to public and private entities, with scholars coming to
conflicting conclusions.49 So even if private entities are able to
retain most of their profits through interpretation of Article I,
it is uncertain whether they can take property without staking
a sovereign claim to it.50
The Outer Space Treaty regime made sense during the Cold
War—both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to
ensure that neither gained a competitive advantage. And they
succeeded. But this regime has had a stifling effect on the postCold War international space-economy.

47. Id. at 567.
48. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
49. See generally Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 28–29 (2005).
Compare Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 370
(1998),
available
at
http://spacefuture.com/pr/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml
(“When Article II is compared to similar provisions in other documents, however, it becomes clear that the narrow interpretation[, which only applies the
anti-appropriation mandate to public entities,] is correct.”), with Jonathan
Thomas, Note, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory Theory for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV.
191, 200 (2005) (“The majority of scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty
and the anti-appropriation clause apply to both public and private entities.”).
50. “[How could] a private entity remove resources or a celestial body from
space as personal property without making a claim of ownership over the
land or area itself[?]” John Adolph, Note, The Recent Boom in Private Space
Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing
Private Property Rights To Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 961, 964
(2006).
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To recap, the Outer Space Treaty is problematic for two reasons. First, it prohibits states, and potentially private entities,
from exercising sovereignty (e.g., appropriating, using, or exploiting) over outer space. Second, it requires a vague amount
of the benefits to be shared between all states.51 And, even if a
party interprets the Outer Space Treaty favorably—to allow
the private appropriation of property and to allow private entities to retain all of their profits—the sheer legal uncertainty of
this interpretation will preclude meaningful investment.52 The
combination of these problems has created an environment
where a potential space venture bears all of the cost, and
stands to lose a significant portion of the return.
D. The Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty was signed in 1979.53 It has only thirteen
signatories, none of whom are space-faring.54 As such, the relevance of the Moon Treaty is questionable. Nevertheless, a brief
overview will highlight the concerns of space-faring states and
explain why the Moon Treaty has not been ratified by any such
state.
The Moon Treaty classifies outer space as the common heritage of mankind, contains a more inclusive non-appropriation
clause, and contains a more direct requirement that benefits be
shared equally among all states. Article 11, paragraph 3 states:
51. See, e.g., White, supra note 49 (“Existing inter-national law provides
limited legal protection and little incentive for investment in outer space.”);
Trimble, supra note 9, at 565 (“The greatest negative effect of international
space law is the uncertainty of the principles contained in the space treaties.
A determinative factor in a corporate decision to undertake a commercial
space venture will be [among other things] to what extent the corporation
believes international space law provides freedom from . . . deprivation relating to its right to conduct business, its equipment, its employees, its technology, and its profits.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
52. See id.; see also Evan Sankey, Coase, Incentives, and the Final Frontier, 1 ECONPRESS 67, 70 (2010) (“Even if some narrow conception of property rights can be teased out of the language of [the Outer Space Treaty], the
wide range of interpretations seems to defeat the purpose of property law. . . .
I cannot imagine a wealthy person who would provide the venture capital for,
say, a lunar mining company without being absolutely sure that said company could procure widely recognized rights to property on the Moon.”).
53. Moon Treaty, supra note 1.
54. See AUST, supra note 38, at 340.
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“Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon [or any celestial body] . . . shall become property of any state, international, inter-governmental or non-governmental organization,
national organization or non-governmental entity or of any
natural person.”55 Therefore, under the Moon Treaty, not even
private entities can appropriate property in outer space. Article
11 continues: “State Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become
feasible.” The appropriation of property is therefore outlawed,
pending the establishment of an international organization to
facilitate it.
Space-faring states make two major arguments against the
Moon Treaty. First, these states claim that the language places
“a moratorium on the commercial exploitation of resources until the international regime is established”56—no regime has
yet been established. Second, space-faring states allege that,
once the regime is established, it will be “unsympathetic to free
enterprise”57 because the benefits will have to be divided equally among all states, regardless of their economic contribution.58
In these ways, the Moon Treaty goes a step further than the
Outer Space Treaty, but because it has failed to gain the support of any space-faring state, it has little relevance to enforceable space law.

55. White, supra note 49 (“[R]eferences to ‘the moon’ in the Moon Treaty
refer to all celestial bodies and areas of outer space other than Earth and
Earth orbits.”).
56. Trimble, supra note 9, at 549.
57. Id. at 550. See also White, supra note 49 (“As a result, the Moon Treaty
has encountered resistance from countries with free market economies.”).
58. See Gruner, supra note 21, at 328–29 (“The United States’ primary
concern was that the incorporation of Common Heritage principles . . . would
discourage development by United States government agencies or private
companies, since developers of resources would lose control over those resources to an international regime after that developer spent money harvesting the resources.”).
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E. Other Applications of the Res Communis Principle
The res communis principle has been applied to two other international territories, Antarctica and the deep sea, and has
resulted in a similar collective inaction problem.
1. Antarctica
Antarctica is governed by a series of treaties: the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959,59 the Environmental Protocol of 1991,60 the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources of 1980,61 the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals of 1972,62 and the various measures adopted
under each (collectively, the “ATS”).63 The ATS is unique because it suspends, but does not renounce, the numerous state
claims of sovereignty over various parts of Antarctica.64 Indeed,
numerous states had and still hold claims to parts of Antarctica, but each recognized that, as the preamble to the Antarctic
Treaty states, “it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.”65 Importantly, the ATS adopts a res communis
approach and restricts the use of Antarctica to scientific exploration.66
The Antarctic Treaty divides its members into two categories:
consultative parties and non-consultative parties.67 The consultative parties have demonstrated an “interest in Antarctica by

59. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
60. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened
for signature Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1460 [hereinafter Environmental Protocol].
61. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
May 20, 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47.
62. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29
U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175.
63. See AUST, supra note 38, at 328.
64. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 59, art. XI.
65. Id. at pmbl.
66. See id. arts. II, IV, VII.
67. See Andrew H. Pontious, Note, A Proposed Regime and Its Ramifications on the Commercialization of Outer Space, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 157, 164 (1991).
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conducting substantial scientific research activity there.”68 Under the ATS, the consultative parties are also the ones who
make binding decisions concerning the uses of Antarctica.69
“The non-consultative parties are those states which have acceded to the treaty but have not yet complied with the ‘demonstrated interest’ test.”70 The non-consultative parties cannot
vote, but may observe the decision-making meetings.71 This
system keeps control of Antarctica in the hands of those states
with true, vested interests.
In the 1970s, mining companies attempted to adopt a convention to regulate mining and the development of resources in
Antarctica.72 Environmental groups, however, strongly opposed
the initiative, and it was not adopted. As a result, the Environmental Protocol of 1991 governs, which strictly prohibits all
non-scientific mining in Antarctica.73 The ATS’ use of the res
communis principle has been prohibitive of commercialization
(beyond tourism) and environmental groups have refused to
allow it.
2. The Deep Sea
The deep sea is governed by the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS”).74 Like the Moon Treaty, and
similar to the Outer Space Treaty, UNCLOS uses the term
“common heritage of mankind.” Under UNCLOS, the deep sea
and ocean floor, which do not come under the purview of any
state’s territorial sovereignty, are classified as the common her68. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 59, art. IX (providing “the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch [sic] of a scientific expedition” as
examples of substantial Antarctic research activity).
69. See Pontious, supra note 67, at 165.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities “sought to regulate minerals prospecting, exploration and development
activities, although mining would only be permitted if all Parties agreed that
there was no risk to the environment.” Mining in Antarctica, BRIT. ANTARCTIC
SURV.,
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/environmental_issu
es/mining.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
73. See Environmental Protocol, supra note 60, art. 7.
74. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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itage of mankind.75 These areas are rich in mineral deposits.76
So, naturally, many states and private entities wish to mine
these deposits. When UNCLOS was being negotiated—at the
same time, incidentally, as the Moon Treaty—the developed
states were wary of adopting a res communis regime (for the
same reasons discussed above with the Moon Treaty) and the
developing states sought to adopt a res communis regime so
that they would not be disadvantaged by their inability to participate.77 In contrast with the ATS, “membership in UNCLOS
is not limited to those involved in active exploration, and each
member may cast one vote.”78 Which, given the larger number
of developing states, resulted in the adoption of the res communis principle.79 However, similar to the Moon Treaty,
UNCLOS called for the establishment of an independent body
to regulate exploitation, and in 1994, the International Seabed
Authority (“ISA”) was established to regulate mining operations.80
The ISA governs deep sea exploitation by requiring miners to
pay fees amounting to $500,000, part of which is given to nonmining states. The ISA operates under three phases: (1) prospecting, or the non-exclusive search for minerals, which can be
done for free; (2) exploration, in which a state or private entity
can explore mineral deposits with exclusivity for $250,000; and
(3) exploitation, which is the actual commercial recovery of
minerals for a fee of $250,000.81 Applicants are also required to
set aside a minable area of equal size to be reserved for mining
by the ISA’s intergovernmental mining body, whose purpose is

75. See Sattler, supra note 49, at 34.
76. See AUST, supra note 38, at 290 (“[The area] is important because parts
of it (mostly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans) are rich in mineral nodules
(lumps), manganese in particular.”).
77. See Sattler, supra note 49, at 34–35.
78. Id. at 34.
79. See id.
80. See UNCLOS, supra note 74, art. 156.
81. See International Seabed Authority, Decision of the Assembly Relating
to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules
in the Area, 6th Sess., 76th mtg., § 1 ¶ 3(a)–(c), § 3 ¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc
ISBA/6/A/18, at 2, 12–13 (July 13, 2000); Zell, supra note 5, at 502–03.
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to “compete with the private entities granted licenses by the
ISA.”82
To this day, mining has failed to develop, likely due to the effects of this common heritage of mankind regime and the huge
costs ($500,000 in fees plus the mandatory reserves) associated
with development.83 Indeed, the United States and other industrialized states are not a party to UNCLOS.84 In sum:
[B]ecause UNCLOS required mandatory transfers of technology, employed an economic model that preempted free-market
enterprise, failed to assure access to future deep seabed resources, and included a voting structure that gave all nations
equal control regardless of their technological capabilities or
contributions to undersea exploration, the United States and
other industrialized nations refused to ratify the 1982 agreement.85

II. SEARCHING FOR THE OPTIMAL REGIME
A number of scholars have offered solutions to the anticommons problem in space. These proposals range from mirroring
the regime used in Antarctica to auctioning off planets. This
Part will analyze nine of the leading theories in a search for the
optimal regime. Many of the proposals assume the legitimacy
of the common heritage of mankind principle, while others reject it. Several attempt to interpret the relevant language of
the Outer Space Treaty to allow for private property rights,
and thus claim to operate within its bounds.
Ultimately, in Part III, this Article concludes that the common heritage of mankind principle should be rejected and offers a solution accordingly. Each section below will clarify

82. Sattler, supra note 49, at 34. See also UNCLOS, supra note 74, at annex III, art. 8.
83. See also Sattler, supra note 49, at 44.
84. See AUST, supra note 38, at 279; Sattler, supra note 49, at 35.
85. Sattler, supra note 49, at 34–35. In the mid-90s the U.N. renegotiated
several aspects of UNCLOS including guaranteeing the United States a seat
on the decision-making body and removing the requirement of transfers of
technology. See id. at 35. Although the United States was involved in the negotiations, and the United States signed the amended UNCLOS in 1994, the
Senate has still not ratified it—which indicates that, even in its amended
form, a common heritage of mankind regime is unsupported by freeenterprise nations. See id.
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whether the author of the proposal under review assumes or
rejects the legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind principle.
A. Proposals Mirroring Existing Regimes
The first three proposals mirror regimes in use today. They
will be covered initially because they are the least likely to
yield different results—each incorporates the res communis
principle, which has resulted in a tragedy of the anticommons.
1. Mirror UNCLOS
Jeremy Zell suggests mirroring UNCLOS’ ISA structure with
the establishment of a Space Resource Authority (“SRA”).86
This proposal assumes that the common heritage of mankind
regime is legitimate, and that all states are deserving of at
least some of the benefits of outer space. As discussed previously, the ISA requires that miners: (1) pay fees to obtain proprietary rights over discovered resources ($500,000), which are allocated to non-mining states; and (2) set aside a mining area of
equal size to be mined sometime in the future by the ISA itself
(known as “reserves”). The SRA would mirror this structure
with slight modifications.
Similar to the ISA, prospecting under the SRA regime would
be free and subsequently obtaining proprietary rights would
require fees. Once mining begins, the entity would be required
to pay royalties to the SRA. The entity would also be required
to set aside reserves; however, the reserves would not be set
aside for the SRA, itself, to mine, but instead would be sold to
other states.87 The proceeds would then be equally distributed
to non-space-faring states.88 While the proceeds from reserve
sales would go directly to non-space-faring states, the fees and
royalties from activity would not.89 The SRA would offer reductions of the royalties, fees, and reserve areas for entities that
operate in non-space-faring states.90 Zell’s idea here is to en86. See generally Zell, supra note 5, at 492–93.
87. See id. at 510–11.
88. Id. at 511.
89. Zell does not say where the proceeds from fees and royalties would go;
presumably the proceeds would fund the SRA.
90. See Zell, supra note 5, at 512–14.
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courage the development of non-space-faring states by incentivizing the operation of Earth-based space functions in those
states. Examples of potential space operations that could be
conducted in non-space-faring states include mission control
stations, equipment manufacturing, and launch sites. The anticommons problem, however, remains.
Again, under the hypothetical SRA, all of the cost and only a
portion of benefit go to the space-faring entities. This system is
effectively the same as the current one. With respect to the reserves, the state to whom the reserve is ultimately sold or the
method by which that state obtains it does not affect the original mining entity’s incentives. Still, it must put up the initial
investment and part with a substantial portion of the mining
area without being adequately compensated—the original mining entity is not selling it, but giving it away to the SRA to sell.
With respect to the potential reduction of fees, royalties, and
reserves, even if they can be reduced or forgiven, there are hidden costs in obtaining such reductions that create a subtler,
deeper problem.
The problem with the proposed reduction in fees, royalties,
and reserves is that developing states do not have the technology, government, security, or infrastructure to support many of
the necessary operations. The cost of developing and establishing those necessities in under-developed states will require an
enormous investment. Space-faring entities are able to conduct
activities in space because of the security and stability of their
Earth-based operations. Developing states with, for instance,
weak police enforcement, undeveloped laws, or unreliable energy sources could put space operations at a huge risk. One can
imagine situations where a command center loses power during
a space mission, or one in which corrupt officials are able to
deny police protection to facilities without the payment of
bribes. These are examples of necessities that we often take for
granted but that are essential to the safe and efficient operation of space activity. The cost of developing these necessary
elements in under-developed states will be borne by the spacefaring states in order to obtain reductions. This investment is
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effectively a fee.91 For this reason, Zell’s solution is likely to result in the same inefficiencies that we face today.
2. Mirror the ATS
Andrew Pontious suggests adopting a regime similar to the
ATS.92 Again, this proposal contemplates the continuation of
the common heritage of mankind principle, and therefore operates under the assumption that all states are entitled to at
least some portion of outer space and its resources. Pontious
suggests a decision-making structure that will mirror the ATS’
consultative/non-consultative structure, but instead uses
states’ levels of investment to determine voting status.93 Only
those states which meet a certain threshold level of investment
will be allowed to vote (compared to the ATS threshold of
“demonstrated interest”).
In addition to the decision-making structure, Pontious provides three general principles that such a regime must include:
1) [A] call for regulation of activities only by those undertaking the activities (albeit with the input of non-participant
members); and 2) it must not require the transfer of specific
amounts of resources, benefits, or technology, to countries not
undertaking the risks of development; and 3) must allow for
some express distribution of benefits to all member countries.94

It is not entirely clear, but it seems as if the distinction between the second principle and the third principle is that the
third principle benefits are, in some form, distributed to all
member countries that are undertaking the risks of development. How a country obtains the status of “undertaking the
risks of development” is left unanswered—certainly not by nonconsultative membership alone, as there must be some level of

91. The author seems to inadvertently make this point. See id. at 515 (“[I]t
is possible for [a space-faring entity] to receive complete forgiveness of its fee
and royalty obligations with a large enough investment in developing nations.”). The problem, of course, is that we cannot ignore that “large enough
investment.”
92. See Pontious, supra note 67, at 184 (“[A] regime similar to but not
identical to that of Antarctica should be adopted.”).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 187.
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contribution (monetary or otherwise). Assuming this is the
case, this proposal is superior to a pure common heritage of
mankind regime because states’ contributions are taken into
consideration when distributing benefits. Still, the problem
remains that different entities putting up different investments
will likely yield different returns. And requiring them to share
all or “some express amount” of returns will incentivize entities
to invest the lowest possible amount while still retaining their
allocation of the returns—a type of moral hazard. This is the
classic anticommons problem.
This is not to say that any form of return allocation will destroy market efficiencies. Royalties and fees, for instance, are
used in several industries today.95 But, these regimes are different from a regime mandating the “express distribution of
benefits to all member[s],” particularly because the moral hazard problem is not present.
3. Mirror the International Space Station Intergovernmental
Agreement
In a 2005 article, Rosanna Sattler proposes what she considers to be “the most workable model for a property rights regime
in outer space” for the short term.96 Her model is based on the
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement
(“IGA”). The IGA has a “hub and spoke structure” with NASA
acting as the hub. NASA signs Memoranda of Understanding
with other space agencies, which, together, govern the International Space Station (“ISS”), a research lab in low Earth orbit.97
Under this regime,
The members of the IGA contribute funds and technology,
and each owns some portion of the space station. The country
with the ownership interest retains control of its particular
physical module and its crew. The nation may contract with
other countries that wish to use its portion for scientific research. The work that takes place on the module then re-

95. Indeed, while UNCLOS was being negotiated, the United States
passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which “requires that
undersea mining companies apply for permits and licenses to mine the deep
seabed.” Sattler, supra note 49, at 36.
96. Id. at 37.
97. See id. at 37–38.
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mains subject to the laws of that nation and is considered to
be within its jurisdiction.98

NASA then “serves as the coordinator,”99 and disputes are settled by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) or World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), depending on the nature of the
dispute.100
According to Sattler’s proposal, this IGA regime could be applied to the commercialization of space.101 NASA could continue
to serve as the coordinator unless a non-governmental organization is agreed upon by the participating states. Other countries would contribute funds and place technology on the Moon
through their space agencies. These space agencies would secure the technology and funding from private businesses which
enter into contracts for such services with these agencies. In
accordance with the terms of the IGA and the Outer Space
Treaty, each individual country, or space agency, would retain
jurisdiction over its crew, its spacecraft, and any structures or
equipment.102 It is unclear how certain forms of commercialization, mining for instance, would mesh with Sattler’s intent to
remain in “accordance with the terms of . . . the Outer Space
Treaty.”103

98. Id. at 38.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 39 (“The IGA could easily be applied to space tourism, settlement, development, and bases of operation on asteroids, the moon, and
Mars.”).
102. See id.
103. Sattler’s earlier analysis of the Outer Space Treaty outlines the differing interpretations (that the Outer Space Treaty might only prohibit the national appropriation of land, and that “land” might not include the resources
mined from the land) but ultimately Sattler remarks that “the appropriation
provision of the treaty is . . . unworkable.” Id. at 28–29. In all likelihood, Sattler is interested only in according with the agreeable terms of the Outer
Space Treaty, which would not include the prohibition on property appropriation. This is supported by the lack of benefit-sharing discussion in Sattler’s
article. She does remark, in her conclusion, that “[t]here would be a need to
accommodate the views of nations with space resources and those in process
of development.” Id. at 44. This suggests that Sattler is assuming all states
are due some portion of outer space, although this point is not clear. Still,
Sattler’s proposal can be implemented in any number of property right distributions.
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Sattler proposes adopting the concept of Exclusive Economic
Zones (“EEZs”) to supplement the IGA regime. EEZs are areas
up to 200 miles from a state’s coast which that state has the
right to “declare” as an EEZ.104 Once declared, that state has
the “exclusive right to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
the natural resources” located in the EEZ, subject only to the
right of other states to “navigate through the waters, fly over
the area, and lay pipelines or other cables on the seafloor.”105
Other states cannot conduct commercial activity in another
state’s EEZ, but states are free to license or rent the area or
resources.106 Sattler proposes transferring this EEZ system to
outer space. Sattler would “giv[e] each nation the option of
building a structure on a celestial body or occupying an orbit
with spacecraft, and then claiming up to a certain amount of
area around their structure or craft for their use.”107 Indeed the
IGA already uses this approach with respect to ISS vessels.108
Sattler’s thought is that “each nation would retain jurisdiction
over its EEZ and could create its own regulations and permitting procedures.”109
Sattler presents a very workable theory, particularly for
practical purposes. However, Sattler provides no method of allocating property in the first place. Certainly, Sattler is not
proposing that all a state or entity needs to do is drop a spacecraft down on a planet to obtain an EEZ over the surrounding
area—this would incentivize the placement of numerous, likely
meaningless, vessels all over the reachable property within our
galaxy. Building on Sattler’s proposal, however, a regime for
defining or distributing property rights over outer space could
utilize the IGA/EEZ regime to govern the use of certain property and the interaction of states around it.110 Without a base
property regime, Sattler’s proposal passes on the fundamental
question of how to distribute property rights in outer space.

104. See id. at 42.
105. Id.
106. See id. This is a concept embodied in Part V of UNCLOS, and even the
United States has declared an EEZ. See id. at 41–42.
107. Id. at 43.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. This will be revisited in Part III.
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B. State-Centered Property Rights
John Hickman and Everett Dolman offer a solution under
which “a state would be permitted to claim sovereignty over
territory on a large celestial body in proportion to its share of
the Earth’s land surface.”111 The particular piece of land a state
claimed would be determined by “the priority of arrival by its
human representatives.”112 This theory is informed by the
Coase Theorem, which suggests that if transaction costs are
low or zero, any allocation of property rights is preferable to no
allocation of property rights.113 This is because, regardless of
how the property rights are allocated initially, the individuals
who value it most will purchase it from the existing owner.114
The authors conclude that “if the policy goal is to encourage the
development of outer space, then any assignment of sovereignty over territory on celestial bodies would be preferable to the
existing structure of vesting collective rights in all states.”115
The State-Centered solution requires withdrawing from the
Outer Space Treaty, but, importantly, it does not abandon the
common heritage of mankind principle because it vests rights
in all states by virtue of their territory (not their contribution
or investment).116 This “proportional allocation upon arrival”
solution was chosen over assigning territory pre-arrival because pre-arrival assignments would not have incentivized
space-faring states to hasten their development of space technologies.117 Allocation upon arrival also avoids having to determine which bit of land to assign to each state, which would
be unsolvable given the varying quality of celestial territory.

111. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 14. The authors also considered
basing the proportional allocation off of GDP and population, but ultimately
declined to do so because of the perverse population growth and GDP reporting incentives they could create. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 12. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
114. See generally id.
115. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 12.
116. See id. at 13–14 (“The solution would continue to designate genuine
common pool resources as res communis while permitting space faring states
to claim sovereign ownership of territory on celestial bodies and other
geo/astrographic positions.”).
117. See id. at 14.
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The authors argue that this solution would garner at least
some support from developing states:
Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand might assert sovereignty over
adjacent territories on Mars by sending a joint team of human
representatives together on a Japanese spacecraft. International inequality would be reduced because non-space faring
states would be at liberty to lease or sell outright their sovereign territories on celestial bodies to other states.118

The primary problem with this solution is that it assumes the
legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind principle. In
this iteration, the entities or states that put up the cost retain
all of their return on investment, but that return is limited to
the land area of the state or the entity’s state of origin. In order
for an entity to obtain more property it would need to pay other, non-space-faring states, which allocates return to states
that are not putting up the cost.
Another consequence of this solution is that states with small
territories are massively disadvantaged. The absurdity of this
result can be illustrated in a few examples.119 Consider Japan,
which has a land area of 145,920 square miles. The total land
area of Earth (excluding the oceans) is 57,510,000 square
miles. This means Japan’s proportional allocation of any celestial body is limited to, roughly, 0.25%. The actual amount of
property this 0.25% represents depends upon the size of the
celestial body. However, this small percentage would likely
provide very little incentive for states like Japan, who have the
technological capability of commercializing outer space but are
only entitled to a small fraction of those resources by virtue of
their small territory on Earth. This small fraction of territory
might not yield enough gains to incentivize Japan to invest. So
too could the cost of purchasing additional territory from nonspace-faring states be prohibitive, particularly if those states
demand high prices for their territorial rights.

118. Id.
119. All geographical information analyzed in the following examples is
derived from CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
COUNTRY
COMPARISONS:
AREA,
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2147rank.html.
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Consider the other side of the spectrum. Sudan, for instance,
is the tenth largest state by land area, at 967,500 square miles.
This entitles it to roughly 1.7% of any celestial body. Sudan
does not have a space program.120 This State-Centered regime
would give Sudan a huge benefit without requiring any investment in space commercialization. Smaller states, like Japan, will be forced to purchase property rights from larger developing states, simply by virtue of having a smaller territory
on Earth. In fact, under this system, Russia would have a right
to roughly 11.5% of every single celestial body in the universe—the next closest state is Canada with 6.7%—and the
other states of Earth would certainly be wary of such a regime.121 Israel, for example, is space-faring, but is only entitled
to 0.01%.
Further, the transaction costs of these bargains would be
very high. In a market with perfect information there would be
no transaction costs or holdouts. But transaction costs “are
likely to be high, at least where rights holders are widely dispersed and the value of rights is subject to a great deal of imprecision,” as they would be in international bargaining over
plots of celestial property.122
A practical problem with this solution is that not all outer
space resources can be divided by territorial surface distinctions. Consider the atmosphere of a celestial body—for instance, the nitrogen in the atmosphere of Mars, which could be
used for rocket fuel.123 Allocating different pieces of the Martian territory will not inform the portion of the atmosphere to
which each state is entitled. Indeed, the same problem arises
with underground reserves, for example, oil wells stretching
across multiple plots of land.
120. See generally Space Program of the Sudan, SUDANESE SPACE AGENCY,
http://www.hudsonfla.com/asudan.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (“[Sudan’s]
space program is . . . nonexistent.”).
121. Russia is 6,601,100 square miles and Canada is 3,855,100 square
miles.
122. Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Resources, Common
Property, and the Collective Action Problem, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 116
(1997). The high transaction costs involved with pre-arrival valuations of
celestial resources are dealt with in more detail in Part II.D.
123. See Rocket Fuel from Mars’ Atmosphere, 22 MEMBRANE & SEPARATION
TECH. NEWS, (Jan. 1, 2004), http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199653172/Rocket-Fuel-from-Mars-Atmosphere.html.
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Hickman and Dolman might suggest the implementation of a
number of property regulations, similar to those on Earth, to
protect and control the harvesting of underground resources—
like, for instance, the rule that so long as land owners drill
straight down under the land, they may extract a resource even
if it is drained from a part of the well located under neighboring land (the so-called “bottoming rule”)124 or regulations on
“the number of acres required for a well and requiring apportionment of the drilling profits among the surface owners within the acreage unit.”125 Terrestrial property laws may mitigate
the problem of controlling underground resources, but they
cannot eliminate it.
Consider a different iteration of this problem: the “seed in the
middle of the fruit” situation. Imagine that a valuable resource
is located in the very center of an NEA. If we divide up the surface territory on the NEA between all states, or only those who
reach it, we have a problem. If we assume that the NEA is a
sphere, then the resource at the core is accessible from every
spot on the NEA. How are we to divide this resource? Logically,
if the resource is truly at the center of the NEA and accessible
from all points on the surface, each state would be entitled to
its proportional share. In this case, then, we have a spacefaring entity with an entitlement to only a fraction of the resource no matter when it reached the NEA or the cost it expended doing so. This not only removes the incentive to reach outer
space resources quickly, but may reduce the incentive to reach
them at all, as the investing entity will have to share the resource with all states proportionally to its land area.
What is worse, resources at the core of NEAs and other celestial bodies may not be knowable until commercialization begins. Imagine the frustration of a space-faring state which puts
up all the cost and successfully reaches an NEA, only to find
that its percentage of the resource is miniscule—and, because
not all states are space-faring, the space-faring state just has to
leave the part of the resource to which it is not entitled untouched, which is a huge inefficiency. This risk is a powerful
disincentive, and, practically, is very similar to the common
heritage of mankind principle in the first place. The State124. See KRIER, supra note 12, at 7.
125. Id.
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Centered solution is interesting, but limiting the gains of
space-faring entities to a portion relative to their land area on
Earth gives rise to problems that will likely result in similar,
potentially prohibitive, disincentives.
C. Functional Property Rights
Wayne White proposes a regime of Functional Property
Rights.126 This solution would grant non-sovereign property
rights to private entities (but not states) who control space objects by virtue of (a) that control and (b) personnel at the location.127 White argues that a state’s legislation would extend to
the area of occupation through its citizens who occupy the area.
Private entities would thereby have law under which to operate, but the territory would not be owned by that state.128 The
areas that an entity could occupy would be determined on a
first-come, first-served basis.129 White writes: “These rights
would terminate if activity were halted, as for example, if a
space object was abandoned or returned to Earth. [Additionally], rights would be limited to the area occupied by the space
object, and to a reasonable safety area around the facility.”130
This regime would allow individual states to determine the
conditions necessary for their citizens and corporations to establish and maintain private property rights and the terms of
abandonment—the inactivity which would extinguish such
rights.131 White argues that these rights, although nonsovereign, would be “almost identical to terrestrial property
rights.”132
White argues that territorial sovereignty should be prohibited and therefore, under his regime, only private entities may
appropriate extraterrestrial property.133 He does this for two
reasons. First, he believes that his proposal is permitted under
the Outer Space Treaty. White subscribes to the interpretation
of the Outer Space Treaty which holds that “Article II . . . pro126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See generally White, supra note 49.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. This is similar to Sattler’s EEZ proposal.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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hibits territorial sovereignty but does not prohibit private appropriation.”134 As discussed above, this interpretation is highly
contentious. Second, White argues that sovereign property
rights “could potentially preclude free access to outer space.”135
Why free access to all of outer space is necessary is not stated,
although one can infer that White subscribes to the res communis principle.
Even ignoring his adherence to res communis, there is a more
fundamental question. White states that “[t]hese rights would
terminate if activity were halted, as for example, if a space object was abandoned or returned to Earth.”136 This seems wholly
incompatible with the practical advantages of private property
rights. Does this mean that once a resource is returned to
Earth for manufacture or sale the private entity loses all claim
to ownership? Certainly this cannot be the case, because only
celestial operations which do not require the transfer of resources back to Earth would be profitable. This would eliminate a large number of proposed uses—mining and energy production, for example. But, even if we assume that private entities can keep the resources they return to Earth, there are further problems.
If no one truly owns the territory, potentially harmful or inefficient uses will go unpunished because entities can simply use
the land and then abandon it. Further, entities will have no
incentive to use the land efficiently or to get the most out of resources—there are no long-term incentives. “The results are
intuitive. Who takes better care of a house, an owner or a renter?”137 Of course, regulations could be established by an intergovernmental body which could regulate the uses and practices
on celestial bodies. This would add transaction costs. However,
those costs might be naturally mitigated if states could, at
some point, exercise some form of sovereignty over celestial

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Sam Dinkin, Property Rights and Space Commercialization, SPACE
REV. (May 10, 2004), http://thespacereview.com/article/141/1.
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territory.138 This option will be explored in more detail later in
this Article.139
D. Unilateral Domestic Auctions (Pseudo Property Rights)
Economist Sam Dinkin has proposed an interesting property
rights regime in which the United States would unilaterally
grant what he calls “pseudo property rights” to its citizens
through domestic auctions.140 Pseudo property rights are necessary, Dinkin believes, because true property rights are unavailable, or at least questionable, under the Outer Space Treaty. Dinkin reasons that because the Outer Space Treaty prohibits states from making sovereign claims to outer space, the
treaty “effectively limits the property rights that U.S. can grant
to its citizens.”141 However, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty does say that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in
outer space . . . shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” Under
Dinkin’s interpretation, this provision allows a state to regulate the activity of its citizens in outer space.142 Dinkin argues
further that, because a property right is essentially “a right to
exclude someone from doing something[,] [b]y excluding US citizens and corporations from doing certain things, the US can
create pseudo property rights in outer space for other US citizens and corporations.”143 Dinkin likens these pseudo property
138. The idea being that, if nations were working towards establishing territorial sovereignty, they would take better, more efficient care of the property (having an eye towards long term return).
139. Specifically in Part III.
140. See generally Dinkin, supra note 137.
141. See id.
142. See id. Several scholars support this interpretation. See, e.g., Trimble,
supra note 9, at 563–64.
Space law has an additional effect on corporations’ space activities
through the grant of jurisdiction to the United States over space objects and their personnel. This jurisdiction provides the United
States with broad powers to regulate corporate activities in space . . .
This authority is necessary in order for the United States to comply
with its obligation to authorize and supervise the activities of its citizens in space.
Id.
143. Dinkin, supra note 137.
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rights to the U.S. patent system.144 This regime could arguably
hold water under the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on territorial sovereignty because the United States would only be
regulating the actions of its citizens, not the territory or property itself. Dinkin writes:
The US should begin to regulate these pseudo property rights.
We should register them. We should hold hearings on them.
We should auction them off in some cases where there is contention just like for spectrum licenses or government land. We
should hold the money in trust until the international community decides who should get it. The President should establish a property rights regime by executive order that is later
written into law by Congress.145

Implicit in this quotation are several points worth discussing.
First, this theory presents the same problem we had with
White’s proposal: what happens when resources are returned to
Earth? In this case, the United States could no longer rely upon
Article VI because the non-governmental entities are no longer
in space, and any subsequent grant of private property rights
in the celestial resources would violate Dinkin’s interpretation
that private property rights are prohibited under the Outer
Space Treaty.
Additionally, Dinkin states that “[w]e should hold the money
in trust until the international community decides who should
get it.”146 Why Dinkin wants the international community to
decide who gets the money is unclear. Perhaps he believes that
this money will satisfy the Outer Space Treaty’s province of
mankind principle—that each state is due its share of outer
space. Placing the funds in such a trust is unlikely to be workable for two reasons. First, the U.S. agency responsible for the
hearings and auctions will likely need the money for funding,
unless it tries to raise taxes or divert already stretched funds.
Second, the United States has already stated that, under its
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, “nothing in Article I,
paragraph 1, diminishes or alters the right of the United States
to determine how . . . it shares the benefits and use of its outer

144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.

554

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

space activities.”147 Of course the United States could, of its
own good will, provide these funds to other states, but it is unlikely to do so—particularly when it could use the money to
fund the auctions. Dinkin does not clarify this problem.
There are several other problems that Dinkin does anticipate.
“Having a piece of paper from the United States saying that no
US entities may interfere with what you are doing does not
necessarily give a US person or business the right to do something.”148 There are two potential problems here which Dinkin
anticipates: (1) prior claims to property and resources and (2)
states which do not recognize the United States’ pseudo property rights regime.149
Regarding the existence of prior claims, Dinkin argues that
because “there is no proven enforcement mechanism for prior
claims, they are unlikely to deter investment if a new strong
property rights regime were established.”150 Indeed there are a
number of groups who have staked claims to property on the
Moon and other planets, but Dinkin is right that there is not,
at present, a mechanism to enforce, or even legitimize, such
claims.151
147. Outer Space Treaty Hearings, supra note 44, at 74.
148. Dinkin, supra note 137.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. “The Lunar Embassy Corporation” has claimed ownership of the Moon
and several other planets. On their legal basis for doing so, their website
states:
Well, in 1980, a very bright, young and handsome Mr. Dennis
Hope, went to his local US Governmental Office for claim registries,
the San Francisco County Seat, and made a claim for the entire lunar surface, as well as the surface of all the other eight planets of
our solar system and their moons (except Earth and the sun). Obviously, he was at first taken for a crackpot, until, 3 supervisors, 2
Floors and 5 hours later, the main supervisor accepted, and registered his claim.
Now, even if you get the claim registered, you are definitely not
out of the woods yet. You must inform others. For example, at the
same time, the Lunar Embassy was obliged to inform the General
Assembly of the United Nations, and the Russian Government in
writing of the claim and the legal intent to sell extraterrestrial properties. Now we’re still not out of the woods. The US government has
several years to contest such a claim. They never did. Neither did
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The more onerous problem is non-recognition by other states,
or worse, similar but unconnected foreign regimes. For example, one can imagine China developing a parallel regime but
refusing to coordinate it with the United States’, such that
property rights to the same celestial property are granted to
both a Chinese entity and a U.S. entity. In response, Dinkin
makes a clever argument using the Outer Space Treaty.152 Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty states that:

the United Nations nor the Russian Government. This allowed Mr.
Hope to take the next step and copyright his work with the US Copyright registry office. So, with his claim and Copyright Registration
Certificate from the US Government in hand, Mr. Hope became what
is probably the largest landowner on the planet today. This is the legal basis by which the Lunar Embassy is selling extraterrestrial
properties.
EMBASSY,
The
Frequently
Asked
Questions
List,
LUNAR
http://lunarembassy.com (select “World Headquarters U.S.A.” under the
“Please choose your country” dropdown next to “English;” then select “General FAQ” appearing under “News & FAQs”) (last visited Dec. 24, 2012). For
a full description of their legal basis, see Question #2 “What is the Lunar
Embassy’s legal basis for selling extraterrestrial properties?” on their FAQ
page. But see Who Really Owns The Moon?, LUNAR REGISTRY,
http://www.lunarregistry.com/info/embassy.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2012),
for a competing view. This site states in relevant part:
These claims are, sadly, false. No single person owns the Moon,
regardless of whether that person sent a letter to the President of
the United States or the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
And just because the U.S. or U.N. never responded to this person’s
letter, that does not mean that he automatically became the owner of
the Moon and the other planets. Check with any attorney and they’ll
confirm for you that this isn’t the way the law works in any country
on Earth.
In fact, Dennis Hope of the Lunar Embassy has fabricated a fictional tale in which a vision came to him, and led him to register a
claim to owning the Moon in 1980. He claims to have filed a document with “his local US Governmental Office for claim registries,” an
entity that simply does not exist. To this date, Hope has not been
able to produce the original document that he purports to have registered; instead, he offers a poorly-worded page that he made up on his
home computer several years after the fact.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
152. See Dinkin, supra note 137.
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A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that
an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in
outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space . . . may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.153

Accordingly, whichever entity reached the property first
could utilize Article IX. There are several problems, however,
with Dinkin’s reliance on this Article. A “consultation,” and
nothing more, will likely provide little protection. Dinkin
agrees that the “consultation” process would not be as “ominous” as a WTO or North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) complaint, but concludes that “it is something.”154
Further, it is uncertain whether the commercial use of property
under a pseudo property rights regime would constitute “activities in a peaceful exploration and use” under Article IX. “Use,”
as discussed previously, has been interpreted to mean nonexclusive exploitation, which by its very nature excludes private commercialization.155 This problem would come down to
interpretation, which is contentious. Dinkin’s ultimate solution
to this problem is to “hope that the US” works with other
space-faring states to sign coordinated, bilateral agreements
effectuating the pseudo property rights.156
Another problem concerns the valuations of property in outer
space. If a resource is discovered on Mars, for instance, and
several U.S. entities possess the capacity to process the raw
resource and turn a profit, the allocation of exclusive rights will
be contentious. According to Dinkin’s regime, a U.S. agency
would hold hearings and eventually auction the property
rights. But prior to arrival, which is when the auction would

153. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX.
154. Dinkin, supra note 137 (emphasis added).
155. Compare Trimble, supra note 9, at 530 (“The word ‘use’ has been interpreted to mean ‘exploitation’ on a non-exclusive basis.”), with Sankey, supra
note 52, at 69 (“[One scholar] has claimed that the right of ‘use’ referred to in
[the Outer Space Treaty] implies a kind of narrow property right. Under this
interpretation, for example, a private body would have a legal right to the
land under a lunar base as long as the base is in use. . . . [I]t seems like there
is sufficient scope of interpretation to mount an argument for at least narrow
property rights in the context of the Outer Space Treaty.”).
156. Dinkin, supra note 137.
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occur given that an entity would not invest in unless it had exclusive rights, a multitude of variables exist. Consider such
variables as quantity, quality (in terms of purity of minerals or
liquids), and the cost of harvesting or mining the materials
from the celestial body’s surface. These variable costs will be
difficult to predict until entities actually arrive on the celestial
body and start harvesting or mining.157 The large amount of
variability would make the process similar to buying a lottery
ticket—you can predict expected returns to a certain extent,
but it is largely a gamble. This example embodies the general
problem that “[t]ransaction costs are likely to be high, at least
where rights holders are widely dispersed and the value of
rights is subject to a great deal of imprecision.”158
One final problem remains. When entities are forced to bid
against one another, the costs will rise. It is questionable
whether the market will function “perfectly” such that the winning entity can still make enough profit to incentivize actually
competing.
[T]he winning bidder would be forced to expend vast resources in compensating the losers . . . [which is] clearly an
inefficient cost from the perspective of space resource improvement . . . [because] valuable resources would still be
wasted in the purchase of the land . . . that could have been
channeled more efficiently into reaching or developing the
planet.159

A looming question for Dinkin is how his proposal and its
purported legality under the Outer Space Treaty mesh with
interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty that require benefitsharing. Perhaps the auction price could be put towards the
satisfaction of this requirement—although, given the discussion above, this is unlikely. The sharing of profits is equally
unlikely given the requirement to pay an auction price upfront.
If it is decided that profits must be shared, it will likely, as it

157. Consider an example: “If, for instance, space minerals are discovered
that were not known at the time rights were initially allocated, it may be
practically difficult for a company that is well-positioned to take advantage of
the new mineral to locate and bargain with all rights holders whose permission must be obtained.” Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 116.
158. Id.
159. Collins, supra note 4, at 213–14.
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does now, continue to disincentivize commercialization. Even if
the United States refuses to abide by this requirement—if it is
so interpreted by an authoritative body, like the ICJ—doing so
would constitute a breach, which would likely give rise to the
United States’ withdrawal. The same uncertainty that gives
rise to the anticommons problem is ever present in Dinkin’s
proposal: even a unilateral decision by the United States to
grant pseudo property rights would be susceptible to uncertainties in terms of legality and international comity under the
Outer Space Treaty, keeping in mind that if the United States
withdrew, it would not be able to avail itself of any of the Article IX anti-interference safeguards.
E. Multilateral International Auctions (True Property Rights)
Evan Sankey has proposed a similar regime to Dinkin’s. Sankey proposes that we withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty
(or amend it to allow property rights) and have an international body auction off real property rights.160 Sankey argues that
all extraterrestrial “property would first come under the jurisdiction of an international regime.”161 Then, “[l]ike the [Federal
Communications Commission], this international regime could
then auction property rights . . . to the highest bidder.”162 And
under economic theory, the rights would end up in the hands of
those entities who value them most. “This efficient allocation of
clear and transferable property rights would . . . provide a
much clearer incentive for companies which wish to develop
and exploit resources on other celestial bodies to secure funding
to do so.”163
An initial question is whether Sankey envisions the amendments to the Outer Space Treaty to remove all sentiments of
the common heritage of mankind principle and the prohibition
on territorial sovereignty. It seems implicit enough that to add
160. See Sankey, supra note 52, at 70 (“One option would be to amend the
Outer Space Treaty to allow for the auction of extraterrestrial property
rights.”).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id. Sankey also argues that this system would “eliminate problems of
congestion in orbit by assigning a value to the scarce geosynchronous orbit
space” which would eliminate the tragedy of the commons plaguing the
reachable space resources (as discussed in Part I.A.). Id.
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real property rights, the prohibition on national appropriation
of property rights must be removed. But whether some portion
of the benefit must be allocated to all states is unclear. Due to
the lack of discussion, it might be safe to assume that Sankey
envisions a complete overhaul of the Outer Space Treaty. If
not, many of the same concerns addressed in the analysis of
Dinkin’s regime above will plague this proposal—although it
seems likely that withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty is
not necessarily a bad thing for Sankey.164
This proposal will face the same problems as Dinkin’s. Entities must expend resources compensating the losers, and must
attempt to value property with huge variable costs, which will
give rise to high transaction costs. But there is a new twist to
the transaction costs here. While the costs of unilateral domestic auctions would likely be high due to the problems associated
with the valuation, international auctions on the scale envisioned by Sankey would give rise to increased and even new
transaction costs that may be prohibitive of investment in the
first place.165
First, the multiplicity of participants on an international forum would dwarf those of a domestic auction. As stated above,
“[t]he more parties involved, the higher the transaction
costs.”166 However, in an auction, the additional players in the
market process add liquidity and improve the quality and accuracy of the prices. And the bidders do not typically interact
with each other. These factors mitigate transaction costs in the
traditional sense. But still, managing the enormous number of
participants and facilitating the process will give rise to bureaucratic costs, which will need to be accounted for. As one
author writes, “[the auction method] has been rejected as inefficient because of the immense bureaucracy that would be
needed to conduct auctions.”167

164. See id. (“[F]or ventures as large, expensive, and inherently uncertain
as the first commercial forays to the Moon are likely to be, it is imperative
that the legal environment be as accommodative as possible.”).
165. See Collins, supra note 4, at 213 (“[The auction method] has been rejected as inefficient because of the immense bureaucracy that would be needed to conduct auctions.”).
166. KRIER, supra note 12, at 365.
167. Collins, supra note 4, at 213.
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Second, the introduction of governments will add an entirely
new cost. “In short, politics will enter the picture. When this
happens, the efficient auction mechanism could be transformed
into a bureaucratic monster.”168 It is all but certain that states
will be heavily involved in the bidding process, given the huge
potential competitive advantage that accompanies ownership of
terrestrial property. The addition of multiple international participants and their politically motivated governments make the
transaction costs unique to the international auction proposal
arguably less palatable than Dinkin’s.169 Indeed, the entities
and states would not only have to pay off the losers of the auction, but spend money on the process, potentially prohibiting
investment in the first place.
F. Non-sovereign First Possession (res nullius humanitatus)
The final two proposals grant property rights to entities
based upon their time of possession, often called “first possession” regimes. Under a first possession regime, property rights
are granted to entities by virtue of their rank-in-time of possession.170 That is, whoever satisfies the requirements of “possession” (whatever they are determined to be) first is granted
ownership.171 This rule is also called the “Rule of Capture” and
it is “[t]he most fundamental rule for determining ownership”
in American property law.172 This rule has been applied to wild
animals, land, surface water, and oil and gas reserves underground.173 The first proposal, in this section, argues for a modified version of the traditional first possession regime that could
exist under the Outer Space Treaty regime. The second pro-

168. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 118 (“In the international arena
where space issues arise, great potential exists for bureaucratic nightmares.”).
169. Indeed several scholars support, as does this Article, a form of first
possession property rights over international auctions, as will be discussed in
more detail in Parts II.F, II.G, and III. See id. at 125 (“Properly crafted, property rights approaches are likely to be lower in cost, and better at protecting
the environment, than are centralized bureaucratic regimes.”).
170. See, e.g., Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of
the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 393–394 (1995).
171. See id. See also KRIER, supra note 12, at 2.
172. KRIER, supra note 12, at 2.
173. See id. at 2–13.

2013] ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES OF SPACE LAW

561

posal, discussed in the next section, advocates for a pure first
possession regime in which the current treaty structure is
abandoned.
The Non-sovereign First Possession proposal argues that celestial bodies should be classified as res nullius humanitatus.174
Res nullius is the antithesis of res communis—meaning, in Latin, a “thing” (res) “for no one” (nullius). The addition of humanitatus, or “humanity,” would classify celestial territory as “a
place where people can still have individual property rights
and be rewarded for their labor based on first possession, but
where settlers will act on behalf of the interests of humanity
rather than a single terrestrial nation.”175 The key is that, rather than claiming the property on behalf of a single state, it
would be claimed “on behalf of all mankind.”176 The author,
Brandon Gruner, argues that “res nullius humanitatus would
guarantee all humans equal access to the rewards offered by
outer space, rather than a de facto equal share in the rewards
reaped from such exploration and exploitation simply because
they are human.”177
The first question is whether equal access alone will satisfy
the Outer Space Treaty’s requirement of benefit-sharing.
Gruner’s proposal requires that settlers “act on behalf of the
interests of humanity.”178 Yet he claims that his system would
“not reject the concept of individual property rights that rewards governments and persons for their efforts”179 and that
there would be no “de facto equal share in the rewards.”180 It is
clear that private entities (or privatized government entities)
would be the sole beneficiaries of their immediate tangible
gains of property ownership—that is, profits from resources or
manufacturing. The “interests of humanity” that are being
served by this regime, however, are not clear. “[E]qual access to
the rewards offered by outer space” is the only thing which
174. See Gruner, supra note 21, at 354.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 353.
177. Id. at 354 (emphasis in original).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 355.
180. Id. at 354. As discussed above, the extent to which the common heritage of mankind principle requires de facto equal sharing in rewards is questionable.
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Gruner cites that might benefit the international community.
This equal access is clearly insufficient to satisfy non-spacefaring states, as they have strongly opposed any regimes other
than those employing the common heritage of mankind. Gruner’s interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty—that states do
not have to share the profits of outer space—is also extremely
contentious as it is, and because we know that non-space-faring
states will almost certainly reject the claim that “equal access
to the rewards” satisfies the treaty’s requirement, it is uncertain why Gruner is concerned with staying within the bounds
of the treaty at all.
The second, and more practical, issue is who actually owns
the property. Property rights are rights against others, and if
individual states cannot obtain territorial sovereignty, they
cannot grant these rights, save for a Dinkin-esque pseudo
property regime. Gruner proposes the establishment of an international regime to create and enforce this non-sovereign
first possession legal system.181 It is not entirely clear, however, how ownership would work. If ownership is governed by the
regime itself, the laws and regulations would need to be extremely comprehensive if they are to be the exclusive and complete body of law on outer space.182 This would give rise to
enormous transaction costs, and would arguably be impossible.
Such a utopian regime would require the agreement of every
state on Earth, or at the least the U.N., which we can assume
would be extremely difficult. The question then becomes why
Gruner bothers with the addition of “humanitatus” to “res nullius.” Claiming property on behalf of the “interests of humanity” without giving any tangible benefits to humanity—because
individuals reap all the benefit of their property—will not only
fail to satisfy non-space-faring states and the Outer Space
Treaty, but will necessitate the creation of a new legal regime
with enormous transaction costs.

181. See id.
182. If no nation has sovereignty, the rights of all individuals in outer space
would be governed by the new regime, which includes all aspects of law, not
just property.
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G. Sovereign First Possession (pure res nullius)
A group of scholars propose a pure first possession regime for
the allocation of property rights in outer space, which would
require abandonment of the Outer Space Treaty. First, Jonathan Thomas argues for a free-market first possession regime.183 The key to Thomas’s regime is state sponsorship, or
“chartering.” Under this system, a space-faring entity would be
granted a charter from a state that would “allow the grantee to
claim land in the name of the grantor state and entitle the
grantee to certain contractual benefits and obligations pursuant to the provisions of the charter.”184 The entity would, once
granted a charter, act “on behalf of” the sovereign state to
claim territory, which the entity would then own by virtue of
rights granted from the charter state.
With charter in hand, each entity would be required to fulfill
three steps: discovery, claim, and possession. Discovery would
“require that the discoverer ambulate and physically stake a
claim upon the extraterrestrial region because ambulation entails significant labor and peril.”185 The claim requirement is
simple enough: “[t]he state should put the rest of the world on
notice that the state believes it owns the property.”186 And the
possession requirement would perfect title to the property.187
Effective possession requires the sovereign to secure its position and continually perform symbolic acts to indicate its legitimate authority over the territory. . . . These acts could include enacting municipal laws, appointing administrators,
levying taxes, providing civil dispute resolution, providing
protection from hostile forces, excluding non-citizens, and
other exercises of police, administrative, and judicial authority.188

Soon after Thomas published his proposal, John Adolph responded with the addition of several elements.189 Adolph supports the “discovery, claim, and possession” system, but would
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See generally Thomas, supra note 49.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 231.
See id. at 232.
Id. at 233–34 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Adolph, supra note 50.
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require the establishment of an international regulatory agency to monitor and regulate activities in outer space.190 Adolph
fears that the fate of outer space would mirror that of pretwentieth century property rights concepts of terra nullius
(“territory of no one,” similar to res nullius191) which were
plagued by “[a]rmed conflict, environmental devastation, and a
lack of regard for the rights of other nations.”192 Accordingly,
Adolph would have the international agency perform three
functions. First, it would allow for non-space-faring states to
participate as observers or non-consultative parties, similar to
the ATS structure, until they actively began to support space
research.193 Second, it would protect the space environment
through regulations to “ensure that one [entity’s] activities do
not prevent others from enjoying the same benefits of space.”194
Third, it would manage conflict—particularly by establishing
“explicit rules for how sovereignty” is established, presumably
through Thomas’ “discovery, claim, and possession system.”195
Along similar lines, Robert Merges and Glenn Reynolds have
proposed a modified first possession and deed registry regime.196 Merges and Reynolds argue that possession must be
defined narrowly enough to prevent over claiming and must
use technology to “coordinate with a ‘deed registry’ on Earth, so
that the positions of boundaries could be confirmed remotely
from the registry office.”197 They also suggest setting aside two
types of preserved areas. The first, “development preserves,”
would be set aside for developing states to give them “a greater
stake in peaceful space development.”198 The second would be
for environmental research and conservation purposes.199
Merges and Reynolds suggest that these areas constitute 1015% of the area capable of commercial development.200
190. Id. at 983.
191. “Terra nullius is vacant land that belongs to no State. The clearest
case is the unclaimed sector of Antarctica.” AUST, supra note 38, at 37.
192. Adolph, supra note 50 at 985.
193. See id. at 983.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 984.
196. See generally Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122.
197. Id. at 121–23.
198. Id. at 123–24.
199. See id. at 124.
200. See id.
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These proposals have merit. While each plan contemplates an
abandonment of the common heritage of mankind principle,
each anticipates providing a voice, and in Merges and Reynolds’ case, actual preserves, to non-space-faring states. Setting
aside area for environmental protection is also agreeable.
Adolph’s conflict concern is well taken, and indeed a system
similar to the WTO or NAFTA structures—inter-organization
arbitrations with the possibility of ICJ referrals—might be efficient.
First possession regimes do, however, suffer from a theoretical defect. The problem is that “the first nation to land on [a
celestial body, and effectively obtain title,] is not necessarily
the one that will use the [celestial body’s] land in the most productive way.”201 The result is too-rapid development in the
technologies required to obtain title, which results in entities
obtaining title without the necessary technology to efficiently
commercialize the property.202 From the analysis above, we
know that the alternative—international auctions—would give
rise to prohibitive transaction costs; so this requires the United
States to make a choice between the lesser of two evils. The
choice becomes clearer when we examine some of the positive
externalities that accompany a first possession race to the
property. As discussed above, an externality “is a cost (or benefit) of any given action that is not taken into consideration by
the actor.”203 This gives rise to the classic tragedy of the commons problem. But here, with a race to the property induced by
a first possession regime, there are positive externalities (benefits) that are non-existent in an international auction process.204
“[I]nefficient races to claim and develop space resources will
come with a significant spillover benefit: the development of

201. Collins, supra note 4, at 212.
202. See id. at 213–14; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 119–20. Indeed, this occurred in the American West in the nineteenth century—people
entered the land sooner than they would have under a competitive bidding
process and were unable to efficiently develop it. See id. at 117.
203. KRIER, supra note 12, at 364.
204. This is not to say that there are no positive externalities existent at all
in international auctions, but that they are distinct.
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more rapid and more diverse space exploration vehicles.”205
Other innovations such as “food synthesis or alternative energy
sources, could lead to the improvement of the standards of living for people on Earth.”206 “In much the same way that society
encourages technical progress through what might be described
as ‘racing for patents,’ on the belief that the spillovers to society exceed the costs of racing, it should consider encouraging a
race ever deeper into space.”207 Indeed, the space race of the
1950s and 1960s did exactly this.208 Still, the problem of inefficient use could be mitigated further.
These authors have provided what I would call the second
step of an ideal property rights regime for outer space. First
possession rights would relieve the tragedy of the anticommons
problem by allowing space-faring entities to retain the full return of their investments. But a practical problem is that,
while enumerating specific elements necessary to “take possession” is reasonable—enacting municipal laws, levying taxes,
policing inhabitants, providing civil dispute resolution—the
satisfaction of those elements in the near-future is unlikely
given the proposed uses of celestial property and our current
technological capabilities. The initial uses of celestial property—mining and manufacturing, for example—can be done with
few astronauts and mostly machines. These types of missions
would be unable to satisfy the possession requirements as set
forth in Thomas’s and Adolph’s proposals. However, it is also
true that these mining missions should not convey title to the
property for lack of establishing true possession.
A regime is needed in which entities can commercialize outer
space at lower operating levels than would satisfy “possession,”
with effective protection of their rights, and effective regulation
of their activities, and a regime in which true territorial sovereignty is available upon the satisfaction of certain factors simi205. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122 at 120–21 (describing how this is
different than the American West, where exploration vehicles were already
developed to the fullest extent possible).
206. Collins, supra note 4, at 213 (describing these innovations as an “explicit aim of the Moon Treaty”).
207. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 120.
208. See supra INTRODUCTION (citing positive externalities of the Apollo program such as heart-monitoring technologies and faster, more efficient computer systems).
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lar to the possession requirements. In this way, we can incentivize investment (avoiding a tragedy of the anticommons),
avoid overconsumption (avoiding a tragedy of the commons),
regulate activities (avoiding inefficient use and environmental
damage), and allow entities and states to do so without having
to establish the onerous possession requirements in order to
obtain any property rights. The first possession advocates provide the second step; what is needed is a first step. Such a twotiered property rights regime, combining many of the positive
aspects of the proposals studied in this Article, is proposed below.
III. THE PROPOSED TWO-TIER PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME
A. Tier One: Non-Sovereign First Possession
The first tier is a system of non-sovereign first possession.
Entities would be able to obtain property rights to areas of celestial bodies and the orbits upon which they operate, much
like Dinkin’s Pseudo Property Rights and White’s Functional
Property Rights. An International Regulatory Body (“IRB”)
would be established to serve two purposes: (1) to provide property rights to and between entities and (2) to regulate their activity. The IRB would be less comprehensive than other proposals’ international regimes because the IRB would not establish a comprehensive new legal regime. The IRB regime would
be much simpler. It would establish basic rights to property
exercisable against other entities and regulate human activity
in outer space. Importantly, entities would be governed by the
laws of their states of origin and international law, but only to
the extent that those laws are not preempted by IRB regulations—much like U.S. federal/state preemption. Because the
IRB only regulates activity between humans (and their entities), it would only have jurisdiction over humans and their activity while in space. To be clear, the IRB would not claim ownership over the entire universe. All of outer space would be
classified as res nullius.
This would be the first tier; the IRB would only preemptively
regulate activity up to the point that the activity satisfies the
criteria for territorial sovereignty, discussed in the next section, at which point the state (or the state of origin of the spacefaring entity) would obtain sovereignty and fall out of the purview of the IRB.
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The IRB could be run like an arm of the U.N. Its composition
could be similar to the ATS or the U.N. Security Council. The
IRB could be made up of permanent members who are spacefaring and a smaller number of rotating members who are nonspace-faring—collectively these members would make up an
“IRB Council.”
For the IRB’s first function, granting property rights, the IRB
would use a pure first possession rule to allow entities entering
space to operate on celestial bodies. These operations would not
convey title. They would only allow the entity to exclusively operate (mine, drill, manufacture, etc.) and retain any returns
(profits, resources, goods, etc.). True ownership rights would
only be granted in the returns—that is, what an entity “captures” or creates is theirs. Disputes over who should get what
part of a celestial body would be decided by first possession—
the entity which gets there first and starts mining obtains exclusive rights against others to the area on which it operates—
granted by the IRB. To be clear, an entity could have exclusive
operating rights only over the area on which it is actually operating (with specific definitions to be determined by the IRB
Council). This system would prohibit giant unsubstantiated
claims to celestial bodies.
There are a number of problems that could arise under this
system, which necessitates the IRB’s second function.209 When
entities do not own the property they are less likely to use it in
its most efficient or sustainable way. Entities would be incentivized to use the property in whatever way would be the most
profitable at that time—the “race to the property” problem described above. This use of property—maximizing short-term
gains at the expense of sustainability—is problematic from
both an efficiency and environmental standpoint. The IRB’s
second function, then, would be to serve as the custodian of
outer space res nullius property.
The IRB Council would set regulations on the use of celestial
property. Activities which would severely damage or pollute the
209. Certain finite resources, like Earth orbits, will require protection as
well—as a race to the orbit might give rise to collisions, overcrowding, and
overconsumption. To avoid a tragedy of the commons, as is the present problem with the geosynchronous orbit, the IRB would simply regulate that a
finite number of satellites may be in orbit and that they will be provided on a
first-come, first-served basis.
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property would be prohibited. Inefficient uses would be regulated to incentivize efficient ones. The IRB could levy fines or
fees for failures to meet these standards. Admittedly, not all
inefficient or destructive uses would be predictable, but any
protection is good protection.
The IRB could also play to the concerns of developing states
and environmentalists. In line with the Adolph and Merges and
Reynolds proposals, this regime could establish scientific reserves for exploration and study, as well as portions of usable
land for developing states. These preserves could be established by the IRB from areas not in use by space-faring entities. Indeed, these reserves would diminish available resources,
but would likely not be prohibitive if limited to an amount less
than 10%, as compared, for instance, to the 50% requirements
of UNCLOS. This is especially true where none of the returns
are required to be distributed to other states.
In terms of procedure, an entity would need to apply for a use
permit prior to launch. The IRB would approve the permit provided that it met all of the regulatory standards. The entity
would then be entitled to operate as set forth in the permit.
The entity’s rights to specific resources and territory located in
the permit area would be granted to the entity upon their successful arrival and operation thereupon. Using similar elements from proposals above, the operations facilities would be
entitled to some EEZ to enable safe and efficient movement.
When the operations ended or fell below a certain level, the entity will be said to have abandoned its temporary, nonsovereign claim to the area and it will lose its IRB-granted
rights against other entities. Funding for the IRB could come
from application fees or taxes paid by space-faring entities.
These would only fund the IRB’s operational costs. At this
stage, disputes could be sent to the IRB Council or a dispute
resolution body made up of IRB Council members. Interactions
between entities would be governed as they are between entities in the High Seas or Antarctica.
To reiterate, this first tier would not require the IRB to establish a comprehensive legal regime, but simply to create a body
of regulations on which to judge proposed permits, regulate
use, and grant exclusive rights against others. This first tier is
necessary because (1) non-sovereign first possession regimes
can give rise to inefficient and damaging uses of property and
(2) the initial uses of space are unlikely to satisfy the posses-
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sion requirements for territorial sovereignty. However, at some
point, the establishment of those possession requirements may
become a possibility.
B. Tier Two: Sovereign Possession upon the Establishment of
Modified Statehood Factors
The second tier is a system of sovereign possession in which
territorial sovereignty (i.e., national appropriation) would be
available upon the satisfaction of certain modified statehood
factors. To obtain territorial sovereignty, an entity, operating
as an extension of the state of its origin, would need to manifest its intent to own title of the land through acts similar to
those proposed by Thomas and Adolph for possession. Once territorial sovereignty is obtained by an entity’s state of origin,
the entity would be free to operate in any way it liked subject
only to the domestic laws of its state and international law.
Prior to that point, entities could mine, harvest, drill, manufacture, and operate so long as they act in accordance with the
regulations of IRB. While under IRB regulation, there would be
one of two ending options: (a) the property is abandoned and
the entity loses its IRB rights against others or (b) the property
comes under the territorial sovereignty of a state. To reemphasize, the race to the property problem is mitigated first by the
IRB regulations, and second, in the event that it comes under
the ownership of a state, it would, by virtue of the factors, be
used efficiently.
To determine the elements which a state must satisfy
through its entity’s activities, we can turn to existing international law. How we classify these extraterrestrial territories
will inform the elements. The requirements needed for a territory to be recognized as a “state” with international personality
are a good place to start.
On Earth, “[t]he generally accepted criteria for statehood is
that the entity has to demonstrate that it has (a) a permanent
population; (b) defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”210 The extent
to which we should employ each of these traditional factors
should be dependent upon the classification of outer space ter210. AUST, supra note 38, at 15 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

2013] ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES OF SPACE LAW

571

ritory—are these entities starting brand new states or colonies?
Colonies, or “overseas territories,” are those territories which
come “under the sovereignty of a State (‘parent State’), but
which [are] not governed as part of its metropolitan territory.”211 The U.N. Charter describes overseas territories as nonself-governing.212 In colonies, the parent state decides the extent, if any, to which the colony has control over such things as
internal affairs, defense, and foreign relations.213 This “colony”
or “overseas territory” classification fits our scenario more accurately than a classification as a brand new state. Using the
colony classification, the traditional statehood requirements of
“government” and “capacity to enter into relations with other
states” will necessarily be satisfied, leaving “a permanent
population”214 and “defined territory.” Yet, because we are not
dealing with the creation of a new state, but instead with the
establishment of a colony on res nullius, we should also look to
how international law handles states’ acquisition of terra nullius.
On Earth, “[t]erra nullius can be acquired by any State (but,
unless acting on behalf of a State, not by a private person or
company) which has the intention to claim sovereignty and occupies the territory by exercising effective and continued control.”215 The operative elements are (1) intent and (2) effective
and continued control. In the Island of Palmas arbitration, it
was held that the continuous and peaceful display of territorial
sovereignty, manifested in different ways depending on the
time and place, was as good as title.216 “The arbitrator stated
the display of sovereignty should be open and public . . . .”217
“Open” and “public” are vague terms and are subject to the aspects of each individual situation. If we were to implement

211. Id. at 29.
212. See U.N. Charter arts. 79, 81.
213. See AUST, supra note 38, at 30.
214. The establishment of a permanent population is, at present, practically
impossible. However, the use of a permanent population (1) can be justified to
a certain extent and (2) is accompanied by some powerful and critical incentives. The use of this factor is discussed below.
215. AUST, supra note 38, at 37–38.
216. See ELINA STEINERTE & REBECCA M. M. WALLACE, NUTCASES:
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–92 (2008).
217. Id. at 92.
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solely the terra nullius acquisition requirements, entities operating under the first tier could be said to have obtained title to
the property. This would allow for a state to claim territorial
sovereignty without manifesting a true intent to establish a
colony. The problem with this outcome is that it would allow
states to bypass the IRB regulations. When states manifest a
true intent to remain, that is, a true intent to take ownership
of, sustain, and develop the property, they are less likely to allow it to be devastated by overconsumption and environmental
damage or to use it inefficiently—the things that plague nonsovereign first possession.
If we combine the remaining elements of statehood with
those required to acquire terra nullius, we have: (a) a permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) intent to claim sovereignty, and (d) effective and continued control, with the caveat
that such control be peaceful, open, and public.
Retaining the permanent population factor from the traditional statehood factors appears on its face to be problematic.
Because, at present, establishing permanent populations on
celestial bodies is practically impossible, this factor has the potential to hold states back more than any other. Making it all
but impossible in the immediate future for states to establish
territorial sovereignty could cause an anticommons problem in
the first tier, as will be discussed Part III.C.3. However, a permanent population is a powerful measure of a state’s vested
interest in territory. A state is less likely to act in a way that is
damaging or wasteful of territory when it has a permanent
population there—this is the benefit of using it as a factor. Doing so, however, is a policy choice. Should states be allowed territorial sovereignty without establishing a permanent population? As discussed, a permanent population is not required to
bring terra nullius under the territorial sovereignty of a state;
but space is different. Human mobility to and from celestial
territories is far more difficult and costly than mobility from
state to state on Earth, and this investment of resources can
serve as (1) a manifestation of a state’s long-term, sovereign
interest in the territory and (2) a powerful incentive to use the
territory in way that is efficient and sustainable—more so than
mere ambulation.
Certainly, a medium between Thomas’s and Adolf’s ambulation and the permanent population statehood factor might exist
to bridge the gap—for example, sustained ambulation or the
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establishment of permanent bases capable of long-term human
habitation. And in terms of efficient and sustainable use, more
strict and comprehensive international regulations on the uses
of outer space could mitigate the problem. But whether we
should enable states to obtain territorial sovereignty over celestial territory without first establishing a permanent population
remains a policy question. Normatively, states will act most
consistently with efficient use and conservation when they
have vested interests in the territory for the long-term, which,
arguably, is manifested most directly through the establishment of a permanent population.
With the permanent population factor, again, we have: (a) a
permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) intent to claim
sovereignty, and (d) effective and continued control. These elements combine the requirements of the discovery, claim, and
possession system proposed by Thomas and Adolph. The discovery element is satisfied through the more onerous requirement of (a) a permanent population, as opposed to ambulation
alone. The claim element is satisfied through (c) intent to claim
sovereignty. And possession is encompassed more broadly in (d)
effective and continued control. Element (b) defined territory,
as discussed above, is included both to encourage clear demarcation and to narrow the scope of territory claimed—in conjunction with (d)—in accordance with Merges and Reynolds’s
suggestion. Thomas’s list of possession manifestations could be
used as examples of ways to manifest a state’s effective and
continued control of a defined territory: “enacting municipal
laws, appointing administrators, levying taxes, providing civil
dispute resolution, providing protection from hostile forces, excluding non-citizens, and other exercises of police, administrative, and judicial authority.”218
The final arbiter of statehood (i.e., whether a state has satisfied the factors) should be left to an international body, like, for
instance the ICJ or even the IRB Council.219 Once title is obtained, the territory would be free of IRB regulation and would
be subject only to the parent state’s laws and international law.
An entirely new international legal regime to govern the con218. Thomas, supra note 49, at 234.
219. Although it could be left up to recognition treaties with other states or
the U.N.
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duct of colonies is unnecessary—current international law can
provide ample precedent.
Consider, for example, the Trail Smelter arbitration between
the United States and Canada. In 1986, a smelter was started
near Trail, British Columbia.220 The smelter produced, as a byproduct, mass quantities of sulfur dioxide, which it released
into the air. This sulfur dioxide caused damage in the state of
Washington in the United States.221 The arbitral tribunal held
that “no state had the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner so as to cause injury by fumes to the territory of another, or to the properties or to persons within that
territory.”222 Indeed, the ICJ or another system of international
courts could be established to handle the disputes between colonies—which would likely arise early and involve property disputes of the Trail Smelter and Island of Palmas flavor—using
existing international law. Trail Smelter is only one example of
many that can provide ample precedent.223
The tragedy of the anticommons can be avoided by opening
up outer space to commercialization. However, a pure first possession regime may have the alternative effect of a tragedy of
the commons. A two-tiered system can achieve, arguably, a
happy medium. Tier one will allow entities to commercialize
outer space at low levels of operation. The IRB will grant entities property rights against others and enable them to retain
their return on investment. The IRB will also serve as the custodian of the res nullius territory, regulating its use and setting
aside preserves for study and use by developing states. If an
entity’s use, in conjunction with its parent state, satisfies the
modified statehood factors—(a) a permanent population, (b)
defined territory, (c) intent to claim sovereignty, and (d) effective and continued control—the parent state would be able to
establish territorial sovereignty over the property. Upon acquisition of territorial sovereignty, the colony would leave the ju220. See STEINERTE & WALLACE, supra note 216, at 175.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 176.
223. See, e.g., Lake Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957) (endorsing
that a state has responsibility to protect other states from injurious acts perpetrated from within its territory); Gut Dam (U.S. v. Can.), 8 I.L.M. 118
(1969) (finding that a state is responsible for the injurious consequences of
acts which have taken place within its territory).
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risdiction of the IRB and be run solely by the parent state and
relevant international law.
C. Drawbacks and Assumptions
Several problems which exist in other proposals exist here,
but to mitigated extents. The race to the property problem is,
as described above, mitigated by the positive externalities of
the race and the regulations of the IRB. The transaction costs
of the IRB still exist, but to a lesser extent than a new comprehensive legal regime or an international auction regime. But
here there are some different assumptions and new potential
problems.
1. Costs of the IRB
In this proposal, I have assumed that fees and taxes on
space-faring entities would fund the IRB. This is a big assumption. In 2010, the ISA adopted a $13 million budget for its
2011-2012 operations.224 These funds came from the U.N.’s
regular budget, which, incidentally, is another potential avenue
for funding. The ISA also requires dues from UNCLOS member
states, which may be yet another option for financing. On the
other end of the spectrum, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) 2011 budget was just over $2 billion.225 The
USPTO vets patents as they are requested, which is similar to
the vetting the IRB would do to commercial proposals. The cost
of the IRB would need to be explored in more detail.
2. The Creation of New States
One question left unanswered is whether private entities
could establish entirely new states.226 As discussed, generally
224. See Press Release, International Seabed Authority, Seabed Assembly
Adopts $13,014,700 Budget for Authority’s Operations in 2011-2012 Biennium
(May
6,
2010),
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Press/Press10/SB-16-17.pdf.
225. See David Kappos, Dir. of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, An
Update on the USPTO’s FY 2011 Budget, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: DAVID KAPPOS’
PUB.
BLOG
(Apr.
22,
2011,
9:08
AM),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/an_update_on_the_uspto.
226. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 38, at 17–18, 26–27, for a discussion as to
whether non-recognized states like Taiwan, Palestine, or the Vatican could
start colonies.
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terra nullius cannot be claimed by new states. But the traditional statehood factors are used to establish international
recognition of new states.227 This proposal does not contemplate
the creation of new states. Of course, it is possible, and even
likely, in the long-term future. This proposal could be modified
to allow for the creation of new states upon the establishment
of all traditional statehood factors. The current international
laws on statehood and recognition could be used in outer space
as they are on Earth. This would likely occur through secession, given the ease of initially gaining territorial sovereignty
as a colony.228
3. Uncertainty in the Second Tier
One potential problem is the uncertainty of the second tier. If
the modified statehood factors are vague or uncertain, or if
states fear that they are too onerous, the factors may induce an
anticommons problem in the first tier. This problem can be
avoided with realistic and clear requirements—like Thomas
and Adolf’s examples. The IRB Council would be responsible
for enumerating the specifics. As technologies develop and uses
become clearer, it would be important for the IRB Council to
revisit the specific requirements of each modified statehood factor, or even the factors themselves, if, for instance, a permanent population is determined to be too onerous. One possibility is to allow entities to apply for milestone certificates from
the IRB Council which would certify and legally acknowledge
certain milestones met by the entity as it approached satisfaction of the statehood factors. These milestone certificates could
be renewable and could serve as evidence supporting a determination of sovereign possession. In any case, the second tier
must have sufficient regulatory certainty so as to avoid an anticommons problem in the first tier.
4. The Illegitimacy of the Common Heritage of Mankind
Finally, this theory assumes that the common heritage of
mankind principle is illegitimate. This principle is the primary
catalyst of the anticommons problem. Its premise, that all
states are due an equal share of outer space, is largely unsub227. See id. at 15–17.
228. See id. at 37.
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stantiated. Perhaps, by virtue of states’ proximity, its use on
Earth is justified for the purposes of ensuring our peaceful coexistence.229 But aside this practical point, the sheer absurdity
of the U.N.’s claim to all of outer space exemplifies its illegitimacy.230 On what basis should humanity simply claim ownership of the entire universe? Imagine making contact with intelligent life and attempting to explain how humans own the entire universe, including the planet or system on which they
live. In fact, this even goes against our traditional notions of
property ownership. John Locke’s theory of private property
ownership was that, generally, property belongs to everyone—
arguably all life in the universe—equally until one “admixed
his labor to it,” at which point it becomes the private property
of that individual.231 Indeed, Locke’s theory is vindicated
through the first possession proposals. Common heritage regimes grant everyone equal rights regardless of their labor or
input of value. There is simply a lack of support for granting
every state a right to every part of outer space by virtue of its
existence on Earth. Further, history and economic theory
prove—by UNCLOS, the ATS, and the Outer Space Treaty—
that such regimes are inefficient. For these reasons, this proposal rejects the legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind
principle. Even still, this proposal supports the establishment
of preserves for developing states and for study—not out of a
belief that it is required, but for environmental protection, scientific research, and to encourage developing states to develop
space-faring technologies.
CONCLUSION
The commercialization of outer space is suffering from a
tragedy of the anticommons. No state or private entity has
been willing to bear the cost of commercialization because international law prohibits national and, potentially, private appropriation; and even if the laws are interpreted to allow private appropriation, they require private entities to share some
quantity of the returns with all states. Indeed, the diversity of
229. Similar to the ATS.
230. See G.A. Res. 1721, supra note 27, ¶ 1; Hickman & Dolman, supra note
16, at 6–7.
231. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 7 (citations omitted).
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interpretation itself creates such an uncertainty that it is prohibitive of meaningful investment. As discussed, the prohibition on appropriation is a remnant of the Cold War era, and the
benefit-sharing requirement is largely unsubstantiated.
This Article has analyzed nine of the leading proposals for
property rights regimes aimed at avoiding the tragedy of the
anticommons. Many of these proposals give rise to new, prohibitive inefficiencies and costs, while others result in arbitrary
results, like Russia being entitled to over 10% of all celestial
bodies and Israel only 0.01%. Drawing from each potential regime, this Article has proposed a two-tier system wherein entities could, first, commercialize space, keep their return on investment, and be regulated to protect against inefficiencies,
and, second, upon the satisfaction of certain modified statehood
factors, obtain territorial sovereignty.

